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Abstract1
Visitors can play an important role in the spread of infections. Here, we incorporate an2
epidemic model into a game theoretical framework to investigate the effects of travel strategies3
on infection control. Potential visitors must decide whether to travel to a destination that is4
at risk of infectious disease outbreaks. We compare the individually optimal (Nash equilibrium)5
strategy to the group optimal strategy that maximizes the overall population utility. Economic6
epidemiological models often find that individual and group optimal strategies are very different.7
In contrast, we find perfect agreement between individual and group optimal strategies across a8
wide parameter regime. For more limited regimes where disagreement does occur, the disagreement9
is (1) generally very extreme; (2) highly sensitive to small changes in infection transmissibility and10
visitor costs/benefits; and (3) can manifest either in a higher travel volume for individual optimal11
than group optimal strategies, or vice versa. The simulations show qualitative agreement with the12
2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Beijing, China. We conclude that13
a conflict between individual and group optimal visitor travel strategies during outbreaks may14
not generally be a problem, although extreme differences could emerge suddenly under certain15
changes in economic and epidemiological conditions.16
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Introduction17
Visitors can play an important role in the transmission and spread of infectious diseases.18
They can serve as susceptible hosts and be infected while staying in one place and then act as19
mobile sources of case imports to other populations [1, 2, 3]. On the one hand, more visitors20
can lead to substantial benefits for the local economy and businesses. On the other hand, some21
infectious diseases spread aggressively in major tourism destinations (e.g., Hong Kong, New York,22
Singapore, Toronto, Beijing), and a large number of visitors can have unexpected impacts on23
public health [3, 4, 5]. For example, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was introduced24
to Beijing, China by a few infected visitors in early March 2003, resulting in a large epidemic[6, 7,25
8, 9, 10, 11]. Other examples where visitors have played a role in regional or international spread26
include pandemic influenza [12, 13, 14], Ebola fever [15] and Middle East respiratory syndrome27
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) [16]. Enforcing restrictions on incoming visitors could be an efficient28
way to control local disease outbreaks [7, 17, 18, 19], but the decision to restrict visitors must be29
weighed carefully due to the economic and social repercussions.30
Game theory attempts to analyse situations where individuals must make decisions in a group31
environment and where each individual’s decision influences the payoff received by the others in32
the group [20]. Many interventions (such as vaccination and social distancing) create positive33
externalities, i.e., benefits to those who did not participate in the intervention, because of herd34
immunity generated by interruption of transmission. Hence, many previous models have illustrated35
the discrepancy between the optimal individual strategy that maximizes personal interest, and36
the strategy that serves the group best by minimizing the overall health burden on the population37
[21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. Although several factors may alter this picture and have been explored38
in successive work — such as the beneficial effects of social norms and prosocial vaccination39
[51, 50] — these models often illustrate a conflict between group and individual optima across a40
very broad region of parameter space, covering most epidemiologically and economically relevant41
regimes [21, 22, 24, 25].42
However, this previous research has been mostly concerned with individuals making decisions43
in a closed population where the disease is already established and is spreading [21, 22, 23, 24,44
25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31], and does not consider multipopulation interactions or the strategic con-45
siderations faced by a visitor deciding whether to travel to an affected area during an outbreak.46
In the context of travel decisions, game theory can be used to answer questions such as whether47
travelling or not travelling to a location is optimal according to a criterion of self-interest, and48
the answers it provides can be contrasted with optimal control strategy from the health authority49
perspective, in terms of maximizing overall population utility.50
In this work, we incorporate an epidemic model (based on the classic Susceptible-Infectious-51
Recovered model) into a game theoretical framework to investigate the effects of strategic decisions52
about travel on local disease control. In contrast to many previous game theoretical analyses of53
decision making in epidemiological systems in a closed population, for this visitor’s game we find54
perfect agreement between the individual and group optimal strategies for a range of epidemio-55
logically and economically plausible parameter values. This agreement can be observed in two56
forms: individual and group optimal strategies both completely reject travelling when the real or57
perceived disease risk level are sufficiently high, or both strategies allow free travel when the real58
or perceived disease risk level is sufficiently low. However, disagreement (or conflict) between the59
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individual visitor strategy and the group optimal strategy are observed in two forms: an overload60
or deficit of visitors compared to the group optimum. In regions where disagreement occurs, the61
disagreement between the individual optimum (corresponding to a “voluntary entrance” scheme)62
and the group optimum (corresponding to a “restricted entrance” scheme) is significant. During63
an outbreak, this conflict is likely to occur at any real or perceived disease risk level. More im-64
portantly, in this region, the model outcomes are highly sensitive to small changes in infection65
transmissibility and visitor costs/benefits. For certain parameter regimes, uncontrolled visitor66
inflow could result in unexpected large-scale outbreaks when the disease risk level suddenly in-67
creases by even a small amount, and local health authority’s travel restrictions could effectively68
control disease outbreaks when visitor inflow is considered to be “overloaded” during epidemics.69
Interestingly, the faster the disease risk information is updated, the more likely a discrepancy will70
occur. Moreover, faster disease risk information updating could effectively prevent visitor inflow71
“overload” and therefore stop an outbreak.72
The remaining parts of this work are organized as follows. In the next two sections, we73
establish a game theorerical framework including both travelling and local populations, to model74
the individual decision making process. In the subsequent section, the results are presented along75
with a detailed discussion.76
Travelling Game77
Our game is a population game where players are individuals in a homeland population78
(the “travelling population”) deciding whether or not to travel to an affected destination. These79
individuals can move through the following states:80
individual in homeland→ potential visitor→ visitor outside→ visitor inside→ individual in homeland.
(1)
A certain fraction of individuals in a homeland population are designated as potential visitors,81
who have the economic means and opportunities for travel. A potential visitor may adopt a82
strategy of travelling to the destination and leaves their homeland, becoming a “visitor outside”.83
Upon arrival at the destination, they become a “visitor inside”, and subsequently they become a84
“removed visitor” and re-join the homeland population, again as a potential visitor. A potential85
visitor corresponds to N1 in Table 1, a visitor outside corresponds to ρN1 in the term f(ρ) in86
Eqns. 7, a visitor inside corresponds to (S1 + I1 + R1) in Supplementary Material S3, and an87
individual in homeland means that a visitor has been removed from the system and re-joins88
individuals in the homeland. More details of the steps individuals may take in travelling can89
be found in Supplementary Material S1. Fig. 1 presents the process of a “travelling” individual90
joining the epidemic system (i.e., from “potential visitor” to “individual in homeland”).91
For simplicity, we suppose that every individual receives the same information and picks92
strategies in the same way (i.e., with equivalent preferences and equivalent payoff for the same93
strategy). An individual can decide whether to travel (i.e., the “travelling” strategy) or not to94
travel (i.e., the “non-travelling” strategy) to their destination. We use r1 to denote the perceived95
cost (negative payoff) of morbidity and/or mortality risk (i.e., the risk of disease, or as a term96
of “health cost”) from infection. Similarly, we use r0 to denote the perceived cost of the risk97
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Figure 1: The epidemic model diagram. Black arrows represent infection status transition paths and red
dashed arrows represent transmission paths. The light blue arrows represent natural births and deaths,
and green arrows represent visitor entry and exit. Square compartments represent local classes, circular
compartments represent visitor classes, and the diamond denotes the “decision” process of potential
visitors. Red compartments represent infectious classes. The light grey area (surrounded by a grey
dashed line) represents “inside border”. The horizontal black dashed line separates the total population
into “local population” (or local residents) and “travelling population” (as in Path 1).
of utility loss for adopting the “non-travelling” strategy, since those individuals lose economic98
or social opportunities. Therefore, we write the payoff for an individual following the travelling99
strategy as100
E1 = −α · φ(ρ;P ) · r1, (2)
where α represents the probability that an epidemic occurs at the destination during a traveller’s101
visit (or, α = 1 for an ongoing epidemic that the traveller knows about before departure), φ(ρ;P )102
is the probability that a visitor is infected during the trip (to the epidemic destination) given that103
the pre-existing immunity level in the destination population is P , and ρ is the overall proportion104
of potential visitors who adopted the “travel” strategy.105
To assess the risk of a visitor being infected during the trip, we need to know the basic106
reproduction number of the disease, R0, i.e., the expected number of secondary cases generated107
by a typical primary case during his/her infectious period in an otherwise susceptible population.108
In the case of R0 > 1, we have φ(ρ;P ) = 0 if P >
(
1− 1R0
)
(see Supplementary Material S2.1).109
This is called perfect herd immunity, i.e., an outbreak cannot occur when the population immunity110
level is greater than
(
1− 1R0
)
[32, 33]. We denote the payoff of an individual following the non-111
travelling strategy as112
E0 = −r0, (3)
Since this is a population game, we also define a mixed strategy (i.e., “p-strategy”), where players113
follow the travelling strategy with a probability p and follow the non-travelling strategy with a114
probability (1− p). The payoff function is then115
4
E(p, ρ;P ) = pE1 + (1− p)E0
= −pαr1 · φ(ρ;P )− (1− p)r0.
(4)
The game remains unchanged if we scale the payoff function by a constant; thus, we eliminate116
one parameter in Eqn. 4 by leaving only the relative risk, r = r0
r1
. Normally, we have 0 < r0  r1117
since the payoff of utility loss, r0 in Eqn. 3, should be less than that of health loss, r1 in Eqn. 2, if118
the disease is severe or potentially deadly. Hence we assume 0 < r  1 in general. Furthermore,119
we have120
E(p, ρ;P ) = p · [r − αφ(ρ;P )]− r. (5)
For convenience, we denote φ(ρ;P ) as φ(ρ) and E(p, ρ;P ) as E(p, ρ) and fix P in the rest of this121
work. We can show that the individual equilibrium (p∗) of the game exists, is the unique Nash122
equilibrium, and is stably convergent (see Supplementary Material S2.1).123
We formulate the (scaled) costs of all potential visitors (game players) as124
Υ(ρ) = ρα · φ(ρ) + (1− ρ)r, (6)
where all terms have the same meaning as in Eqn. (5). More details are provided in Supplementary125
Material S2.2. We also define the group (Pareto) optimum ρ∗ as the value of ρ for which the126
population average cost function Υ(ρ) of all potential visitors (i.e., all game players) is minimized.127
Epidemic Model128
Formulation of Epidemic Model129
To specify the infection probability φ(ρ), we adopt the standard susceptible-infectious-removed130
(SIR) model. Individuals of the destination population (excluding visitors) are categorized as131
susceptible to the disease (S, those who may be infected), infectious (I, i.e., those capable of132
transmitting disease), or removed (R, these who are either recovered and immunized or died).133
Similarly, visitors are also categorized as susceptible (S1), infectious (I1), or removed (R1). We134
use S, I, and R (or S1, I1 and R1) to denote the proportions of susceptible, infectious and recovered135
individuals in the destination (visitor) populations, respectively. This patchy population structure136
was proposed previously in [1, 2, 34, 35]. Before taking the trip, visitors are assumed to be totally137
susceptible. We illustrate this “local-and-travelling population” interactive epidemic system in138
Fig. 1. We further assume that the susceptible visitors follow a logistic growth mechanism.139
• The visitor population capacity (e.g., the number beds in hotels) of one place is finite and140
assumed to be a constant.141
• Low (/high) volume of visitors will increase (/decrease) the recruitment effort of travellers142
for a business trip and decrease (/increase) the expense for a recreation trip.143
Thus, logistic growth is a reasonable choice. After eliminating R′ and R′1 (see Supplementary144
Material S3 for details), we formulate the epidemic model as145
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
S ′ = µ · (1−K1 − S)− βS · (I + I1)
I ′ = βS · (I + I1)− (γ + µ)I
S ′1 = fρ ·
[
1− S1 +
(
1 + γ
ν
)
I1
K1
]
− βS1 · (I + I1)− νS1
I ′1 = βS1 · (I + I1)− (γ + ν)I1
(7)
where fρ = f(ρ) = ρλN1 represents the rate of incoming visitors, K1 is the maximum visitor146
capacity that the destination is willing (or able) to accept, N1 is the number of all players (i.e., all147
potential visitors), and players who adopt the “travel” strategy, travel from the homeland to the148
destination at a rate λ = 1/3 day−1 (see Supplementary Material S6.1). We express both K1 and149
N1 in units of proportion of the population threshold (destination population plus the maximum150
visitor capacity) and we fix N1. We assume that all trips are three days long, hence visitors return151
at rate ν = 1/3 day−1 (see Supplementary Material S6.3). We summarize all model parameters152
in Table 1.153
The contact term β is a function of R0. Using the next generation matrix method [42], we154
derive the basic reproduction number of our epidemic model as155
R0 = β ·
[
(1−K1)
γ + µ
+
K1
γ + ν
]
, (8)
thus, β ∝ R0 when the values of the other parameters are fixed.156
Model Equilibria157
We denote the disease-free equilibrium (DFE) as158
E (1) =
(
S(1), I(1), S
(1)
1 , I
(1)
1
)
=
(
(1−K1), 0, fρK1
fρ + νK1
, 0
)
,
where I = I1 = 0 and S
(1)
1 < K1. The DFE (E (1)) is globally stable when R0 < 1, whereas it159
is unstable when R0 > 1. When R0 > 1, there is an endemic, i.e., the visitor-absent endemic160
equilibrium ,161
E (2) =
(
S(2), I(2), S
(2)
1 , I
(2)
1
)
=
(
γ + µ
β
, µ ·
(
1−K1
γ + µ
− 1
β
)
, 0, 0
)
,
where S1 = I1 = 0. Specifically, S
(1) = γ+µ
β
is the reciprocal of R0 of the standard SIR model162
[33]. E (2) can be realized when fρ in S ′1 (see Eqn. 7) becomes 0 and it is locally stable. When163
R0 > 1, there also exists an endemic equilibrium corresponding to a mixed state of local and164
visitor infections (i.e., infected visitors), denoted as E (3) =
(
S(3), I(3), S
(3)
1 , I
(3)
1
)
. The solution of165
E (3) can be obtained explicitly by taking the nonnegative root of [S ′, I ′, S ′1, I ′1]T = 0 (0 represents166
the zero vector) with both I 6= 0 and I1 6= 0.167
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Table 1: Summary table of model parameters. The ranges of the parameters are used for the
sensitivity analysis.
Parameter Notation Value Range/Remark Source(s)
Basic reproduction number R0 2.5† [1.0, 10.0] [36, 37, 38, 39]
Mean duration that visitors are outside border λ−1 3 days [0.1, 10] S6.1
Ratio: travelling playerspopulation threshold N1 7.5% [5.0%, 15.0%] assumed, S2.2 and S3
Ratio: visitors capacitypopulation threshold K1 7.0% [5.0%, 15.0%] S6.2
Mean infectious period γ−1 5 days [2.0, 10.0] [40]
Mean human lifespan µ−1 70 years fixed -
Mean duration that visitors are inside border ν−1 3 days [0.5, 15.0] S6.3
Relative risk (as in Eqn. 5) r = r0r1 10
−3 [10−4, 10−2] S6.4
Probability of travelling p - [0.0, 1.0] Eqn. 4
Optimal probability of travelling p∗ - [0.0, 1.0] S2.1
Proportion of visitors ρ - [0.0, 1.0] Eqn. 2
Optimal proportion of visitors ρ∗ - [0.0, 1.0] Eqn. (6) and S2.2
Cost of all game players Υ - - S2.2
Difference between group and individual optima ∆ρ ρ∗ − p∗ [−1.0, 1.0] Eqn. (10)
Probability that disease outbreak occurs α 0.01‡ [0.001, 0.02] assumed
The point values of the disease parameters reflect influenza, and the ranges of the parameters reflect a broad
range of other infectious diseases.
The values and ranges of the parameters related to travel (i.e., K1, r, ν
−1 and λ−1) reflect Hong Kong as the
default destination.
† One can determine the function β(R0) explicitly from Eqn. 8, and R0 = 2.5 is also applicable to the 2003 SARS
epidemic according to [6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 41]
‡ α = 1.0 during epidemics.
Probability of Visitors becoming Infected168
Given the model in Eqn. 7 and the assumption that all individuals in a compartment leave169
it at the same rate regardless of how long they have been there, we may take the probability of a170
visitor becoming infected during the trip to be equal to the ratio of the rate at which susceptible171
visitors (S1) are infected to the rate at which susceptible visitors (S1) leave the destination [22],172
φ(ρ) =
βS
(3)
1 (I
(3) + I
(3)
1 )
βS
(3)
1 (I
(3) + I
(3)
1 ) + νS
(3)
1
= 1− ν
β(I(3) + I
(3)
1 ) + ν
,
and thus, αφ(ρ) = α− να
β(I(3) + I
(3)
1 ) + ν
.
(9)
We present the numerical results of the relationship between φ(ρ) and ρ in Supplementary Mate-173
rial S2.1. Given the relationship between β and R0, one may derive the relationship between R0174
and φ(ρ) explicitly.175
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Results and Discussion176
Individual Equilibrium and Travelling Optimum177
We first explore how the predicted travel strategies depend on the basic reproduction number178
(R0) and the relative risk (r). Many factors, including seasonal (climatic) factors and the evolution179
of viruses, could affect R0. Additionally, media coverage of the risk and relevant educational180
programs [44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49] could influence visitors’ perception of the risk, thus changing r1181
and r (Eqn. 5). During an ongoing epidemic (α = 1), we find that both r and R0 significantly182
influence the individual equilibrium p∗ and the group optimum ρ∗ (Fig. 2). (The values of the other183
parameters are fixed and listed in Table 1, and small variations in their values do not dramatically184
change the trends of these relationships.) We observe that both the individual and population185
optima have the same qualitative relationship with R0 and r: both optima are monotonically186
decreasing functions ofR0 and monotonically increasing functions of r. This behaviour is expected,187
since an increasing transmissibility should reduce both the individual incentive to travel and the188
group optimal rate of travelling, while a decline in the relative risk of travelling should encourage189
travel, both individually and as a group. More surprisingly, the sudden transition of the individual190
optimum from 0 to 1 (as shown in panel a) is steeper than that of the population optimum (as191
shown in panel b).192
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Figure 2: Individual and population optima as functions of the basic reproduction number R0 and
the relative risk r during an epidemic (α = 1). Panel (a) shows the Nash equilibrium proportion of
travellers p∗; panel (b) shows the group optimal proportion of travelllers ρ∗, with colour codes to
indicate magnitude. The range of R0 and the values of the other parameters are listed in Table 1.
To further explore the relationship between the individual and group optimum, we study193
their difference:194
∆ρ = ρ∗ − p∗ (10)
More details are given in Supplementary Material S2. A plot of ∆ρ versus the population optimum195
ρ∗ and the individual equilibrium p∗ during an ongoing epidemic (α = 1) show that they agree196
perfectly for most of the parameter space (Fig. 3). For most of the parameter region, ρ∗ = p∗ = 0197
8
or 1 (i.e., the white area in Fig. 3). These two situations can occur when both the disease risk198
(reflected by R0) and perceived risk are (1) either considerably high, i.e., ρ∗ = p∗ = 0, in which199
case no one intends to travel and complete border entrance restrictions are implemented, or (2)200
considerably low, i.e., ρ∗ = p∗ = 1, in which case all individuals intend to travel and border201
entrance is completely unrestricted. Variations in the values of the other parameters do not202
change the trends of these relationships (Table 1).203
However, despite the broad agreement across the parameter plane, the region where ρ∗ and204
p∗ are discrepant reveals interesting findings. During an epidemic, most locations are expected to205
receive fewer visitors (with limited visitor entrance) than usual when there is no epidemic. But206
the model predicts parameter regimes where the group optimal solution requires a higher volume207
of travel than what is individually optimal: in the blue region of the parameter plane, ∆ρ > 0,208
meaning p∗ < ρ∗ (Fig. 3a). In this regime, the health authority would wish to encourage more209
travel than actually occurs. However, if either the disease risk R0 or the perceived payoff of210
disease risk r1 decline even slightly (for instance, due to seasonal factors and/or changing media211
coverage) the situation is reversed, and the discrepancy in interests ∆ρ could change from ∆ρ > 0212
to ∆ρ < 0 (red region in Fig. 3a). When ∆ρ < 0, a health authority restriction on visitors is213
desired and only ρ
∗
p∗ of the visitors should be allowed to enter in order to achieve the population214
optimum ρ∗. In summary, Fig. 3 shows a surprising contrast to many game theoretical models215
comparing individual and group optimal outcomes: in large parts of the parameter space, there is216
no discrepancy. However, when a discrepancy does emerge, it can emerge very quickly with small217
changes in parameter values, and moreover, the individual optimal travel rate could exceed the218
group optimal rate, or vice versa.219
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Figure 3: Discrepancy between individual and population optima as a function of the basic re-
production number R0 and relative risk r, during an epidemic (i.e., α = 1). Panel a shows the
relationship among r (Eqn. 5), R0 and ∆ρ (Eqn. 10); and panel b shows the relationship between
r and ∆ρ for R0 = 1.0, 2.5, 5.0, 10.0. In panel a, the colour code quantifies ∆ρ. The white area
represents ∆ρ = 0 under the two cases that ρ∗ = p∗ = 0 or 1. In panel b, ρ∗ is in green, and p∗
is in purple. In both panels, the range of R0 and the values of the other parameters are listed in
Table 1. Please refer to the electronic version for the figure with color.
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Example of the 2003 SARS Outbreak in Beijing220
The epidemic patterns predicted by our model under a manipulation of the group optimal221
strategy ρ are qualitatively similar to the epidemic curve during the 2003 SARS outbreak in222
Beijing, China, resulting from the timing of certain travel-related events during the outbreak.223
Fig. 4a (adapted from Ref. [11]) shows weekly reported cases in Beijing during the outbreak.224
Data are available from the electronic supplementary material. The time point when knowledge225
of the epidemic was first made public, e.g., “SARS made reportable (Apr 10)” in Fig. 1 of Ref. [11],226
refers to the date of news press [52]. The time point of the official start of restrictions on travel227
refers to the events “outbreak announced publicly by government (Apr 20)” and “fever check at228
airport begin (Apr 22)” in Fig. 1 of Ref. [11]. We note that these two events resulted in almost229
no one travelling to Beijing, i.e., ρ = 0, until the end of the SARS epidemic [53].230
We also note that, although the Beijing SARS outbreak was initially sparked by travellers,231
the proportion of cases in Beijing caused by travellers over the entire outbreak is thought to be232
small, especially after fever screening began [54]. Also, the United States Centers for Disease233
Control suggests that travellers to SARS-affected destinations take precautions to avoid infection,234
suggesting a nontrivial infection risk for travellers [55]. The latter two features of the Beijing235
SARS outbreak are consistent with our model assumptions.236
Fig. 4b shows a model-simulated epidemic curve that largely matches the observed epidemic237
curve. To generate this curve we focus on changes in R0 (disease transmissibility) and ρ (pro-238
portion of players adopting the “travel” strategy). We decrease ρ from 0.5 to 0.25 at the time239
indicated by the blue dashed vertical line in Fig. 4b. This decrease is associated with the start of240
public awareness of the SARS risk in Beijing after it was revealed to the public [52]. Similarly, the241
decrease in R0 from 2.5 to 1.75 as also indicated by the blue dashed vertical line would correspond242
to an accompanying reduction of the effective contact rate due to the onset of public awareness of243
SARS. (The effective contact rate is defined as the product of the contact rate and transmission244
probability per contact. It is believed, and is modelled, to be negatively, or at least non-positively,245
related to reported disease incidence [34, 45, 46, 47, 56].) The time lag, i.e., the gap between the246
pairs of vertical solid and dashed lines of the same colour in Fig. 4, is fixed at three days due to247
the mixed effects of the incubation period (or the latent period) of SARS infection and the delay248
of human reaction to the outbreak. The model simulation largely captures the observed SARS249
epidemic between March and May 2003, as shown in Fig. 4a-b and Fig. 8 of [57].250
The model-predicted outcome of an earlier implementation of travel restrictions (see blue and251
red dashed lines in Fig. 4b) are obtained by fixing the combinations of R0 and N1, and setting252
ρ = 0 (i.e., nobody is able or willing to enter due either to travel restrictions or cautious behaviour253
due to SARS risk). We found that the earlier the travel restrictions are implemented, the more254
effectively the disease outbreak level is reduced. By contrast, an uncontrolled and sudden increase255
in the proportion of visitors (e.g., increasing ρ from 0.5 to 0.75) could yield a larger outbreak, as256
indicated by the gold dashed lines in Fig. 4b.257
We note that our objective in Figure 4 is to convey how the model framework applies during258
an unfolding epidemic where travel restrictions are put in place partway through the epidemic.259
Hence, although the starting value of R0 is epidemiologically plausible for SARS [58, 59], the260
parameters were chosen for convenience rather than being fitted systematically. However, slight261
changes in the parameter values away from this parameter regime do not change the outcomes.262
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(a) The 2003 SARS outbreak in Beijing, China
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Figure 4: The 2003 SARS outbreak in Beijing, China. Panel a shows the reported cases during
2003 SARS outbreak in Beijing, China (adapted from Ref. [11]); and panel b shows the numerical
results of the epidemic model (see Eqns. 7). In both panels, the vertical lines represent the
starting points of events, and the vertical dashed lines represent the time points with lag of three
days. In panel a, the SARS epidemic and government intervention are given on timeline from
Mar 05 to May 29, 2003. The back dashed line is the time series smoothed by using the LOESS
function (R version 3.4.3 ). In panel b, the initial states are set as [S(0), I(0), S1(0), I1(0)] =
[(1−K1), 0, (K1 − 1× 10−8) , 1× 10−8], with R0 = 2.5, N1 = 15% and ρ = 0.5 (see grey parts of
the bars on the top). The blue and red dashed lines are the simulations under “what if” scenarios
in which travel restriction policies were implemented earlier. The black and gold dashed lines
are under “what if” scenarios in which travel restriction (or reduction) failed and travel input
suddenly increased respectively. The values of the other parameters are assumed to be the same
as those in Table 1, and the changes in parameters are marked at the top of the panel. Note that
the timelines are the same in panels a and b.
Also, additional numerical results for wider parameter variations in Supplementary Material S4263
show the range of possible dynamics exhibited by the model.264
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Additional Sensitivity Analysis265
The sensitivity analysis of the baseline model (Supplementary Material S5) shows that the266
results are most sensitive to the relative risk (r), basic reproduction number (R0), and the rate267
at which individuals leave the destination (ν). More detailed discussion of the influence of these268
model parameters on model predictions are given in Supplementary Material S7.269
In the baseline model, for simplicity, we assume that visitors do not bring infection back270
to their home country. To amend this shortcoming, we introduce an additional probabilistic271
case importation risk level into an extended model (see parameters in Table 1). Under this272
extension, our main results are unchanged. Please refer to Supplementary Material S9 for a273
detailed discussion. We also included pre-existing immunity among visitors in an extended model,274
and also found that our main results were unchanged. A detailed discussion can be found in275
Supplementary Material S8.276
Model Limitations and Future Research277
In this subsection, we discuss possible model extensions and some limitations. In the baseline278
model, we assume individuals have accurate knowledge of the real basic reproduction number R0.279
However, an imbalance between the perceived and actual R0 could exist [60, 61, 62]. We denote280
R˜0 as the perceived R0. We expect the perceived R˜0 to correlate positively with the actual281
R0. Thus, we assume R˜0(R0) is a nondecreasing function of R0. Given the perceived disease282
risk R˜0, the payoff of the disease risk r1
(
R˜0
)
, i.e., r1 as a function of R˜0 given in Eqn. 2, is a283
nondecreasing function of R˜0 and a nondecreasing function of R0. One of the simplest forms of284
r1
(
R˜0
)
is r1 ∝ R˜0 with a positive scalar. Future research should explore the impact of such a285
difference between R0 and R˜0.286
In addition, travelling players may not always be informed about outbreak events in a timely287
manner. Thus, a time delay between R0 and R˜0 could exist. We denote R˜0(t; τ) = R˜0(R0(t−τ)),288
where τ > 0 is the time lag between the occurrence of infection risk and the perception of infection289
risk. If we set τ = 0 for all t by assuming humans receive accurate knowledge of a risk when it290
emerges, we have limτ→0+ R˜0(t; τ) = R˜0(R0(t)). In this work, we consider a limiting case of τ = 0.291
In reality, this assumption can be relaxed, and a reasonable estimate can be used. The value of292
τ depends on the impacts of the risk and the efficiency of the media and relevant programs (e.g.,293
news press coverage [22, 34, 45, 47], education programs [22, 49, 63], communication effectiveness294
in social networks [48, 49, 64, 65, 66, 67] and pre-existing public health awareness [14, 48, 65]).295
In this work, we assumed the same information availability and the same strategic response296
for the entire visitor population (see Eqns. 2 and 3). However, different groups of people could have297
different risk perceptions or risk preferences, hence the payoffs could differ between individuals.298
This has been demonstrated in previous game theoretical models to lead to different equilibria299
and optima regarding the human response to epidemics [26, 68]. Consider the situation where300
E1 = E0 (see Eqns. 2 and 3). In this case, some individuals may prefer the travelling strategy301
(i.e., risk-seeking preference), while others may prefer the non-travelling strategy (i.e., risk-averse302
preference).303
Future models including a heterogeneous population could improve the realism of the model304
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and help test the robustness of our predictions. One way this could be done is by allowing the305
disease natural history and economic parameters to vary between individuals (as noted in the306
foregoing paragraph), to reflect varying health conditions and socio-economic status. Another307
way to account for heterogeneity at a larger scale is to allow for a patchy environment [1] where308
different sub-populations are subject to different conditions. Under such circumstances, we expect309
that the boundaries in Fig. 2) would probably become less sharp, although it is not clear a priori310
how large the effect would be. We expect that most forms of heterogeneity would not change311
our finding that the individual and group optima tend to agree in this kind of game theoretical312
framework, although the regime shifts implied by Fig. 2) would probably be less dramatic if313
heterogeneity were included.314
Conclusions315
Many game theoretical studies of closed socio-epidemiological systems find a significant dis-316
crepancy between individual and group (Pareto) optima in a broad range of economic and epidemi-317
ological parameters. In this work, we studied an open socio-ecological system in which visitors318
decide whether to travel to a location with an ongoing outbreak. Surprisingly, we found perfect319
agreement between the individual and group optimal strategies for broad ranges of parameter320
values. When a disagreement between the individual and group optimal strategies occurs, the321
discrepancy was very large and highly sensitive to small changes in disease transmissibility and322
visitor costs/benefits. For instance, if disease transmissibility increases by even a small amount,323
the uncontrolled incoming visitors are capable of causing an unexpected outbreak. This suggests324
that a discrepancy between the individual and group optima could emerge suddenly in real-world325
settings, provided that slight changes in economic and epidemiological factors (parameters) occur.326
However, timely implementation of travel restrictions by health authorities may effectively prevent327
large-scale outbreaks.328
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S1 More Explanation of the Travelling Procedure
In this work, the game players are potential visitors who have a plan to visit a travel destina-
tion. Potential visitors will end up in two categories: those who take the trip and those who cancel
the trip (see path (1) in main text). Any individual of the home country of visitors may become
a potential visitor at any time. The number of potential visitors (or N1 as the ratio in the model,
see Table 1 in main text) is mainly dependent on the travelling pattern (or seasonality) of the
destination. A potential visitor may decide to travel (i.e., become a “visitor outside”) according
to his/her knowledge on the disease risk at the very moment the decision being made. Thus, there
are three cases regarding to the different travelling decisions.
• A potential visitor decides to travel and successfully completes the trip. Since the trip
is short (three days), we assume that the visitor does not change his/her travel decision.
Finally, s/he returns to his/her home population after the trip.
• A potential visitor decides to travel but fails to complete it due to travel restriction at the
destination. In this case, the visitor returns to his/her home population.
• A potential visitor voluntarily cancels the trip and stays at his/her home population.
Therefore, in any case, the decision making process of the proposed travelling game follows the
sequential game scheme (i.e., the decision is “renewable” for every participant in this game). We
note that local “travel restriction” only has its effects on these potential visitors who decide to
travel; and the potential visitors is mainly influenced by the travelling pattern to the destination.
S2 Individual Equilibrium and Group Optimum
S2.1 Individual Equilibrium
We assume that a proportion ε (0 < ε < 1) of potential visitors will take the trip with a
probability p (i.e., playing p strategy) and the rest of potential visitors (1 − ε) will take the trip
with probability q, where q 6= p. Then, the overall proportion of visitors (ρ¯) who will take the trip
among all game players is
ρ¯ = εp+ (1− ε)q. (S1)
Therefore, the payoff to individuals playing p-strategy and q-strategy are E(p, ρ¯) and E(q, ρ¯),
respectively. The payoff gain (or loss if negative) of an individual playing p strategy against q
strategy is the difference of two payoff functions,
∆E = E(p, ρ¯)− E(q, ρ¯) = (p− q) [r − αφ(ρ¯)] . (S2)
where the parameters have the same meaning as in the main text.
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Figure S1: Schematic diagram of Nash equilibria under three “existence” situations (panel (a) and
(b)) and numerical results of the relation between φ(ρ) and ρ (panel (c)). In order to have a clear
demonstration of three kinds of Nash equilibria, panel (a) and (b) show the trends of φ(ρ;P )
against ρ and P . Panel (c) shows the relation between scaled φ(ρ) and ρ. The scaled φ(ρ) =
1000 × φ(ρ). In panel (c), the transparently blue line are from 1,000 random samples with
parameter sets, and the black dotted line is the result with fixed parameter values. The parameters’
values and ranges can be found in Table 1.
Existence of Nash Equilibria The probability of a visitor becomes infected during the trip
(0 < φ(ρ) < 1) must increase strictly (which is in line with [?], as explained in Epidemic Model
section) when a proportion ρ of game players choose the travelling strategy (see Fig. S1). Hence,
when P is fixed, the minimum of φ(ρ) occurs at ρ = 0 and the maximum of φ(ρ) occurs at ρ = 1.
Here, we show the existence of the unique Nash equilibria by achieving ∆E > 0 in Eqn. (S2)
under three situations.
• If α · min{φ(ρ)} = αφ(ρ = 0) > r, αφ(ρ) > r for all 0 < ρ < 1, so for any 0 < ε < 1 of
Eqn. (S1), ∆E > 0 for any q 6= p if and only if p = 0 (such that p− q < 0 for all 0 < q < 1),
thus, p∗ = 0 is the unique Nash equilibrium.
• If α · max{φ(ρ)} = αφ(ρ = 1) 6 r, αφ(ρ) < r for all 0 < ρ < 1, so for any 0 < ε < 1 of
Eqn. (S1), ∆E > 0 for any q 6= p if and only if p = 1 (such that p− q > 0 for all 0 < q < 1),
thus, p∗ = 1 is the unique Nash equilibrium.
• If α · max{φ(ρ)} = αφ(ρ = 1) > r > αφ(ρ = 0) = α · min{φ(ρ)}, there exist one and only
one p∗ such that αφ(ρ = p∗) = r. For all q < p, we have ρ¯ < p (according to Eqn. (S1)) for
any 0 < ε < 1 and, similarly, for all q > p, we have ρ¯ > p for any 0 < ε < 1. Hence, for
αφ(ρ = 1) > r > αφ(ρ = 0), we always have ∆E > 0 for all q 6= p if and only if p = p∗, so
p∗ is the unique Nash equilibrium such that αφ(p∗) = r.
These different situations of the relationship between αφ(ρ) and r are due to different values
of the pre-existing immunity level (i.e., P , Fig. S1) and different values of parameters (Table 1).
Convergent Stability Follow the previous work [3], let p be closer to p∗ than q (i.e., the
unique Nash equilibrium of Eqn. (S2)), which means q < p 6 p∗ or q > p > p∗ (note that p is not
3
necessarily equal to p∗). Given φ(ρ) increases with respect to ρ, if q < p 6 p∗, (r − αφ(ρ¯)) > 0 for
all ε in Eqn. (S1), we have ∆E > 0. Similarly, we can also have ∆E > 0 if q > p > p∗ as desired.
Therefore, the Nash equilibria in all of the three scenarios are convergently stable.
S2.2 Group Optimum
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Figure S2: The optimal proportion of travelling-players becoming visitors (i.e., ρ∗ corresponding
to Eqn. (S4)) during epidemic (i.e., α = 1). Panel (a)-(c) corresponds to R0 = 1.0, 2.5 and 10.0
respectively. Blue lines are Υ(ρ) in Eqn. (S4) with respect to different values of r and red dots
are the minima (when ρ = ρ∗) of Υ(ρ), of which ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The values of r are shown on each blue
line. The range of R0 and values of other parameters are on Table 1.
For all potential visitors, we aim to minimize the overall cost (negative payoff) of all players,
which also appears to be the goal of governmental control. We further ignore the possibility that
infected visitors bring the disease back to their home population. We can express the expected
cost in term of ρ (i.e., the overall proportion of all players who choose to travel),
Υ(ρ) = N1 · [ρα · φ(ρ) · r1 + (1− ρ)r0] . (S3)
Here, N1 is the ratio of total number of players to the total local population capacity (i.e., sum of
local visitors capacity and number of population). The other terms have the same meaning as in
Eqn. (S2). We further scale Υ(ρ) by eliminating N1 (because N1 can be fixed as a constant) and
one risk term (replacing r0 and r1 by r =
r0
r1
[2, 6]. Thus, the (scaled) cost of potential visitors is
Υ(ρ) = ρα · φ(ρ) + (1− ρ)r, (S4)
where all terms have the same meaning as in Eqn. (S2). The optimal travelling proportion is
the optimal ratio of successful visitors over all game players, which is denoted by ρ∗. ρ∗ can be
obtained by minimizing Υ(ρ) (see Fig S2 as numerical examples).
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S3 Simplification of the Epidemic Model: Elimination of
R and R1
Based on the framework of the standard SIR compartmental model (see “Epidemic Model”
section in the main text), we write the original epidemic model as:
S ′ = µ · (1−K1 − S)− βS · (I + I1),
S ′1 = fρ ·
(
1− S1 + I1 +R1
K1
)
− βS1 · (I + I1)− νS1,
I ′ = βS · (I + I1)− (γ + µ)I,
I ′1 = βS1 · (I + I1)− (γ + ν)I1,
R′ = γI − µR,
R′1 = γI1 − νR1.
(S5)
Here, fρ = f(ρ) = ρλN1 represents the rate of incoming visitors. K1 is the ratio of maximum
capacity of visitors to the total population capacity. K1 controls the upper bound of the magnitude
of visitors in the model system (thus, generally, K1 is fixed) S6.2. N1 has the same meaning as in
Table 1 and Eqn. (S3). N1 is the ratio of total number of potential visitors (i.e., travelling-players)
to the total population capacity (i.e., the sum of maximum visitors capacity and the size of local
population, see Table 1, (S + I + R + K1) in model (S5)) For simplicity, we fix N1 in this work.
Model parameters are summarized in Table 1 in the main text.
Most visitors stay inside border (i.e., in the destination) for a considerably short period (three
days, ν−1 in Table 1 and S6.3). Since (S + I +R) +K1 ≡ 1 (i.e., the total population capacity, is
scaled to unity) and S1 + I1 +R1 6 K1 < 1, we have (S + I +R) + (S1 + I1 +R1) 6 1.
Under the quasi-steady-state assumption, which is widely adopted in within-host modelling
studies [7, 5], we replace the term S1+I1+R1
K1
(in model (S5)) by
S1+(1+ γν )I1
K1
(by forcing R′1 = 0) in
order to eliminate equation of R1. This approximation can be interpreted as that all R1 come
from I1 and only
γ
γ+ν
of I1 could transit to R1 at any time (other part of I1 simply leaving the
system at rate ν). Thus, R1 6 γγ+ν I1 6
γ
ν
I1 (both γ and ν are positive), and then, S1 + I1 +R1 6
S1+
(
1 + γ
ν
)
I1. Since infected (I1) visitors will quickly joinR1 class at the rate γ and the proportion
of recovered visitors are relatively small, term S1 + I1 +R1 is very close to S1 +
(
1 + γ
ν
)
I1. Note
that γ
ν
I1 is simply the upper bound of R1, and, after all, the effects of both I1 and R1 are little
(compared with S1) regarding to the visitors input.
After eliminating R′ and R′1, we reformulate the epidemic model as,
S ′ = µ · (1−K1 − S)− βS · (I + I1),
I ′ = βS · (I + I1)− (γ + µ)I,
S ′1 = fρ ·
[
1− S1 +
(
1 + γ
ν
)
I1
K1
]
− βS1 · (I + I1)− νS1,
I ′1 = βS1 · (I + I1)− (γ + ν)I1.
This version is used in the main text.
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For mathematical convenience, we fix (S + I + R) + K1 ≡ 1 (i.e., the population threshold,
or the total population capacity, is scaled to unity, 1). We also let S1 + (1 + γ/ν)I1 6 K1, thus,
S1 + I1 + R1 6 K1 is guaranteed. Therefore, we have (S + I + R) + (S1 + I1 + R1) < 1 in our
complete model (see S3).
S4 Some Numerical Examples
The epidemics could be amplified by the uncontrolled visitor inflow, even when the basic
reproduction number is low. Fig. S3(a) shows an epidemic becoming out of control withR0 declines
(from 2.5 to 2.4) while the incoming visitor restriction fails (red line). The disease outbreaks can
be controlled if the incoming visitors are restricted (i.e., by holding ρ = 0.1 unchange, see the
green line). Since ρ∗ is sensitive in a narrow range of R0 and r (see section “Results of Individual
Equilibrium and Travelling Optimum” in main text), ρ∗ could have very large change (e.g., from
0.1 to 0.99) with slight change on R0 (e.g., from 2.5 to 2.4 in Fig. S3(a)). The large variation in
ρ∗ could lead to the discrepancy between ρ∗ and p∗. The decline of disease risk (R0) could avoid
this discrepancy (by achieving p∗ = ρ∗ = 1). The increase of disease risk (R0) might also avoid
this discrepancy (by achieving p∗ = ρ∗ = 0).
When the risk of disease (in term of R0) is higher than the perceived risk (i.e., the perceived
risk is low), the local government is suggested to restrict visitor entrance. Otherwise, the actual
proportion of the incoming visitor is likely to be greater than the optimal level (ρ∗). Fig. S3(b)
shows the epidemic becoming out of control when R0 slightly rises and incoming visitors are not
controlled (green line). The disease outbreak can be controlled by visitors entrance restriction
(red and purple lines).
Fig. S3(c) shows the similar trend as the early stage of SARS epidemic (in Jan - Feb, 2003).
The rapid increasing could be mainly due to the increased visitors during Chinese new year (see
Fig. 2(a) of Ref. [10]). Namely the increase of visitors could lead to a disease outbreak.
S5 Sensitivity Analysis of Payoffs
Partial rank correlation coefficient (PRCC) analysis is deployed to assess the dependence
of the model results on the parameters [7, 8, 9]. The ranges of model parameters used for the
sensitivity analysis are summarized in Table 1 in the main text.
Fig. S4 shows the PRCCs between model parameters and individual payoff (E, see Eqn. (5)),
and population risk level (Υ, Table 1 and S2.2) respectively. The ranges of model parameters are
given in Table 1. Since “payoff” (the term in Fig. S4(a)) is the defined as the opposite number of
“risk level” (the term in Fig. S4(b)), some model parameters have symmetric PRCC result with
respect to level “0” (see the vertical grey dashed line in Fig. S4) on both panels. The PRCCs
show that the results are most sensitive to the group of the relative risk (r), the basic reproduction
number (R0), and the rate at which individuals leave the destination country (ν). Hence, these
parameters should be the focus of data collection efforts during outbreaks when a travel policy
must be decided. In Fig. S4(b), the basic reproduction number (R0) and relative risk (r) is
6
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Figure S3: The simulation results of local infections (I) of epidemic model (panel (a) and (b), see Eqns. (S3))
and the SARS epidemic of China in 2002-03 (panel (c)). The baseline scenario contains that initial states are set as
[S(0), I(0), S1(0), I1(0)] =
[
1
R0 , 1× 10−4,
(
K1 − 5× 10−6
)
, 5× 10−6
]
; with R0 = 2.5 and ρ = 0.1 for panel (a) and
(c), and R0 = 1.1 and ρ = 0.99 for panel (b). Values of other parameters are on Table 1. In panel (a), the blue
line is the simulation results under baseline scenario of panel (a); the green line is of basic reproduction number
(R0) decreasing to 2.4 since the 201-st day (vertical green dashed line); based on the change of green line, the red
line is of travelling proportion (ρ) increasing to 0.99 since the 301-st day (vertical red dashed line). In panel (b),
the blue line is the simulation results under baseline scenario of panel (b); the green line is of basic reproduction
number (R0) increasing to 1.2 since the 701-st day (vertical green dashed line); based on the change of green line,
the red line is of travelling proportion (ρ) decreasing to 0.50 since the 751-st day (vertical red dashed line); based
on the change of red line, the purple line is of travelling proportion (ρ) continually decreasing to 0.10 since the
801-st day (vertical purple dashed line). In panel (c), the blue line is the simulation results under baseline scenario
of panel (c); the green line is of travelling proportion (ρ) increasing to 0.99 since the 301-st day (vertical green
dashed line).
strongly positively related to the population risk level (Υ), and the visitors leaving rate (ν) is
negatively related to Υ. Opposite results can be seen in Fig. S4(a) for the individual payoff.
S6 Interpretation and Value of Some Model Parameters
S6.1 Rate of visitors moving from outside status to inside status λ
The value of the mean period of a traveler stay outside border (λ−1) can be estimated by
referring to the “deadline” of cancellation of hotel room, flight or even car-rent for travelling
usage. For example, according to cancellation policies of Airbnb (https://www.airbnb.com/home/
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Figure S4: Sensitivity analysis results of (PRCCs) between model parameters and individual payoff
(panel (a), see Eqn. (5)), and population risk level (Υ, in panel (b), see Table 1). The black dots
are the estimated correlations and the bars represent 95% C.I.s. The ranges of model parameters
are summarized on Table 1.
cancellation_policies), the waiver of refund charges can be considered for room-cancellation at
least 1 day (with “flexible” policy) or 5 days (with “moderate” policy) in advance, thus we can
make a rough estimation that λ−1 ≈ 1
2
× (1+5) = 3 days. According to Hong Kong Airline refund
policies (http://www.hongkongairlines.com/en_HK/flight/refund), λ−1 > 2 days.
S6.2 Visitor capacity at destination K1
According to the monthly travelling statistics (http://partnernet.hktb.com/en/research_
statistics/latest_statistics/index.html) and travelling summary sheet (http://partnernet.
hktb.com/en/research_statistics/index.html) from PartnerNet—Hong Kong tourism website
for travel trade partners, there were approximate 58,000,000 travelers in Hong Kong of 2015
or 2016, and the local hotel room occupancy is roughly 87% over the whole period of time.
Provided the information in S6.3, the local tavelling capacity of Hong Kong can be estimated as
NK1 = (58000000/87%)×3365 ≈ 550000, hereN denotes the number of total population capacity in Hong
Kong (i.e., the sumation of upper bound of the number of travelers and local population, N =
NK1+N·(S+I+R)). Given the popualtion statistics from World Bank (https://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=HK), 7,300,000 is the number of local population in Hong
Kong in 2015-16, thus N = NK1 + N · (S + I + R) = 550000 + 7300000 = 7850000, and
K1 =
550000
7850000
≈ 7.0%.
S6.3 Rate of visitors leaving destination ν
Referring to immigration department of the government of Hong Kong (http://www.immd.
gov.hk/eng/services/visas/visit-transit/visit-visa-entry-permit.html), Chinese citizens
can stay in Hong Kong for at maximal 7 days, and the majority of non-Chinese citizens can stay
for roughly at maximal 15 days. According to the monthly travelling statistics from PartnerNet -
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Hong Kong tourism website for travel trade partners (http://partnernet.hktb.com/en/research_
statistics/latest_statistics/index.html), averagely, 75% of travelers are from mainland China
and 25% are from other regions; for Chinese travelers, 50% of them are overnight passengers (ex-
pected to stay for 1
2
× (7 + 1) = 4 days) and 50% them are one day visitors (expected to stay
for 1
2
× (0 + 1) = 0.5 day); for non-Chinese travelers, 66.67% of them are overnight passengers
(expected to stay for 1
2
× (15 + 1) = 8 days) and 33.33% them are one day visitors (expected to
stay for 1
2
× (0 + 1) = 0.5 day). Therefore, on average, one random-selected traveler would be
expected to stay in Hong Kong for ν−1 = 75%×(50%×4+50%×0.5)+25%×(2
3
×8+ 1
3
×0.5) ≈ 3
days (thus, ν−1 = 3 days).
S6.4 Relative risk r
The range of relative risk (r) can be approximated by simply checking the claim settle-
ment odds of the travel insurance corresponding to the target place. For an example, according to
travel insurance premium and coverage websites of Hang Seng Bank (https://bank.hangseng.com/
1/2/personal/insurance/travel-leisure/travel-insurance/travel-premium and https://bank.
hangseng.com/1/2/personal/insurance/travel-leisure/travel-insurance/travel-coverage), r ≈
10−3.
S7 Further Discussion of Model Parameters
Relative risk r = r0
r1
(see Eqn. (S2) and Table 1) is the ratio of the “non-travelling” payoff
(E0 = −r0, see main text) to the upper bound of the “travelling” payoff (i.e., E1 = −r1, see
main text). The range of r could be obtain by referring to the claim-settlement-odds of the travel
insurance with regard to the travelling destination (normally, r ≈ 10−3, see S6.4).
Number of visitors N1 is the ratio of total number of potential visitors (i.e., game players)
to the total population capacity. Provided total population capacity can be fixed in short term,
the magnitude of N1 is proportional to the number of potential visitors. We fix N1 in this work.
However, the number of potential visitors could be affected by seasonal factors (such as weather,
school terms, holidays, etc.) and economic and politic factors (such as traffic expenditures, hotel
fees, travelling policies [1], etc.), thus N1 could be time-dependent in reality.
Agreement and conflict between ρ and p In Eqns. (S5) (and the epidemic model in the
main text), fρ
λ
= ρN1 is the proportion of visitors (outside border and about to be inside border
shortly) to the total population capacity. ρ (see Table 1) is the proportion of potential visitors
eventually becoming visitors correspond to the optimal travelling strategy selection. Therefore,
we have ρ = p∗ (where p∗ is individual’s optimal travelling probability) under normal scenario
(i.e., no serious disease outbreak, of which no restriction on travelling entry). However, during a
serious disease outbreak, the local government will consider restricting travelling entry (in order to
lower the number of visitors inside border) according to population’s optimal travelling proportion
(i.e., ρ∗), and this would change ρ = min{p∗, ρ∗}. Numerical examples of local governmental
9
intervention on travelling entry (i.e., ρ) are discussed in section S4. Note that, under governmental
intervention scenario, ρ should only equal to ρ∗ if ρ∗ < p∗ (otherwise ρ∗ > p∗, ρ = p∗ is equivalent
to normal scenario).
Period of visitors staying outside the border λ−1 is defined as the mean period for a visitor
used to get inside the border (see Table 1). We stepwise the “visiting” population as in Path (1)
in main text. The λ−1 is the mean period for a visitor evolving from a “visitor outside” border to
a “visitor inside” border. Note that a “potential visitor” can only become a “visitor outside” if he
has finished his final travelling decision (see S1). The knowledge of the range of λ−1 can be learnt
by referring to the “deadline” of withdrawal of various travelling “services” (e.g., hotel, flight,
etc., see S6.1). Therefore, the speed of health information spread could be related to λ−1 because
that the updating of relevant information can “renew” individual’s final decision (i.e., re-choose
strategy). Therefore, higher speed of information spread is corresponding to lower value of λ−1.
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Figure S5: The relations among r, λ and ∆ρ (see main text) during epidemic (i.e., α = 1) with
R0 = 1.0, 2.5, 5.0, 10.0 for panel (a)-(d) respectively. The values of r and λ are in “log10” form.
The color code of the difference of individual and population strategy, ∆ρ, is shown on the color
key. The white area (in each panel) represents ∆ρ = 0 under two situations that ρ∗ = p∗ = 0 or
1. The values of other parameters are on Table 1.
Fig. S5 shows the relations among relative risk (r), rate of visitors pass border (λ) and ∆ρ
during an epidemic. When λ increases, the discrepancy (∆ρ) of individual (p∗) and group optimum
(ρ∗) appears under a wider range of relative risk (r). The discrepancy (∆ρ) shifts leftwards (the
direction r increases) asR0 increasing. Particularly, p∗ and ρ∗ meet agreement (i.e., no discrepancy
as ρ∗ = p∗ = 1) when R0 = 1.0 (which means disease cannot spread).
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S8 Pre-existing immunity among visitors
For the model in the main text, we assume that all visitors are susceptible when entering the
travel destination. In reality, this is not true. Pre-existing immunity of visitors could exist (e.g.,
the health authority of the visitors’ home could recommend vaccination for visitors planning to go
to a certain region where an epidemic is ongoing). The immunity level of the visitor population
is dependent on a number of factors, including previous outbreaks, vaccination program policy
and coverage, and the infection or vaccination history of the visitors, and may be estimated if the
information is available. Thus, we denote
• PT as the immunity level of the visitor population of a country;
• PO as the immunity level of the rest of the population of the home countries of the visitors;
• PD (i.e., term P in main text) as the immunity level of the local population of travel desti-
nation.
Then, the assumption PD = PT or PD = PO, i.e., the immunity levels of local and origin
populations are uniform, is unnecessary and can be relaxed. Moreover, the assumption PT = PO
can also be relaxed. In reality, PT > PO could be common because (i) health authority of the
visitors’ home could recommend vaccination for visitors planning to go to an epidemic region; and
(ii) vaccinated visitors are more likely to travel to an epidemic region.
After including PT, the revised epidemic model becomes:
S ′ = µ · (1−K1 − S)− βS · (I + I1),
S ′1 = (1− PT)fρ ·
[
1− S1 + I1 +R1
(1− PT)K1
]
− βS1 · (I + I1)− νS1,
I ′ = βS · (I + I1)− (γ + µ)I,
I ′1 = βS1 · (I + I1)− (γ + ν)I1,
R′ = γI − µR,
R′1 = γI1 − νR1,
with all the terms remaining unchanged, except for inclusion of (1−PT) in (1−PT)fρ·
[
1− S1+I1+R1
(1−PT)K1
]
.
We note that we could include one more equation,
X ′1 = PTfρ ·
[
1− S1 + I1 +R1 +X1
(1− PT)K1
]
− νX1,
where the additional state X1 denotes visitors being protected against the disease, and the term
S1+I1+R1
(1−PT)K1 (in the revised model) should originally be written as
S1+I1+R1+X1
K1
(the same as in
Eqn. X ′1). Since the magnitudes of both I1 and R1 are relatively small with respect to S1 and X1,
we ignore the effects of I1 and R1 on the incoming visitors rate. Thus we have
S ′1 ≈ (1− PT)fρ ·
[
1− S1 + I1 +R1 +X1
K1
]
− νS1.
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We can easily see that PT of fρ joins in X1, (1−PT) of fρ joins in S1, and the leaving rates of X1
and S1 are the same as ν. To eliminate term X1, we have X1 ≈ PTS1(1−PT ) ; therefore,
S1 + I1 +R1 +X1
K1
≈ S1 + I1 +R1
(1− PT )K1 ,
as shown in the above revised model.
The term (1 − PT) can be interpreted to mean that the protected visitors (PT) are directly
removed from the system (not by joining R1, but by being “completely” removed from the model
system), and the effect on the visitor input rate is partly reflected by “reducing” the local visitor
capacity (i.e., replacing K1 by (1−PT)K1). In this work, PT is fixed to 0. Then, a new simplified
model can be derived (from the revised model) by following the same method in S3 (by eliminating
R and R1). Since we regard PT as a fixed nonzero constant (i.e., PT 6= 0) during a short time
period, and mathematically speaking, the effect of PT can be transformed into a reduction of the
magnitudes of fρ and K1 [11], the main results in this work will hold for the revised epidemic
model.
S9 Risk of visitors bringing the disease back to their home
country
For the analysis in main text, for simplicity, we assume that visitors do not bring diseases back
to their home country. This assumption is clearly overly optimistic. To amend this shortcoming,
we may introduce one additional probabilistic factor of the risk level and obtain an improved
travelling risk function
Υ = Υ(ρ, pi) = N1 ·
[
ρ · αφ(ρ) · (1 + pi · %
r1
) · r1 + (1− ρ)r0
]
,
where pi is the average probability that the disease is brought back to the home country of a
traveller, and % is the average payoff of the disease spreading in a randomly selected home country.
Generally, we note that % > r1, since the consequences of a disease spreading in a region are
presumed to be more serious than the consequences of a single individual being infected from a
utilitarian point of view. We fix the ratio of %
r1
and use a similar idea as r = r0
r1
. We view (1+pi · %
r1
)
as a scaler and assign a value to pi. Thus the results of our original framework still hold, namely,
the epidemic risk level of the travelling population, as listed in Table 1 in main text is a simplified
version when pi = 0.
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